After t, one of the two hypotheses must fail, for their predictions contradict each other [^4]. been shown to conform to the rules of logical inference, we usually consider it analyzed into other terms which include reference to a time and place. observed before now, or (2), green, and has not been observed before now. His perception is mistaken, but we do not dismiss him as a poor perceiver or suddenly begin to doubt his judgment of his perception. But every emerald has also been grue. You do not currently have access to this article. But there is not. But these worries can be dismissed; Goodmanized predicates are not illegitimate. Another way to see the problem is that the example of ‘grue’ seems to show that exactly the So, anyone who has observed a long positive correlation between things of any two kinds A and B in a wide variety of circumstances over a long interval of time, has reason (or will come) to believe that all As are B. When I see that every emerald I have observed has been green, I am inclined to form the belief that something about the emerald causes it to be green. This is a perfectly fine definition, in the sense that it gives us clear conditions on when the word He shows this by inventing the predicate ‘grue.’ It is defined as A reason to be dissatisfied with an explanation of justification in terms of accepted observed before now, or (2), blue, and has not been observed before now. A second intuitive thought is that ‘grue’ is somehow unnatural, because it is defined in terms of Presumably, the rules of induction are what enable us to project into the future – that is, to be able to make accurate predictions with regard to each subsequent, unobserved instance. Naturally existing in the world are green things, even if there is no one in the world to observe it. It just means that we will sometimes be wrong. good first step in putting together a logic of induction: a generalization is confirmed by its Each time we observe a new emerald, it is found to be green. The the predicate seem so artificial, so it is natural to think that it is also part of what makes its use Most users should sign in with their email address. canons of induction to apply only to inductive arguments which do not contain terms which are Why the difference? For full access to this pdf, sign in to an existing account, or purchase an annual subscription. Change ), You are commenting using your Google account. If we have a concept of causation, then we can believe two things to be connected causally and apply the concept to the situation. The definition of “grue” is: (74). Don't already have an Oxford Academic account? It seems like this is a However, when I see that every emerald I have observed has been grue, I am not inclined to form the belief that there is something about the emerald that causes it to be grue. worse. practice. But in addition to this, I submit that you also see (or have some perceptual awareness of the fire boiling the water. But which hypothesis fails? But the time of first observation is something entirely coincidental. If all we do is infer from particular instances to general claims, then we have equal evidence for two competing hypotheses [^3]. So every observed emerald has (so it seems) supported the hypothesis that : all emeralds are green, and the hypothesis that all emeralds are grue. If you saw the scene as composed just of isolated elements and didn’t see the fire boiling the water, then you couldn’t abstract the causal relation and come to have a concept of causation. Consider the set of green things. In this post I will talk about Goodmanized predicates and raise some concerns over their legitimacy. Why is my experience of the green and not the grue? Objects that are grue before t are still grue after t – they do not become suddenly not-grue. Consider the set of green things, e.g. You could not be signed in. This worry is not devastating. [^1]: Whether it actually confirms the hypothesis or not is less clear. Barry Ward, Explanation and the New Riddle of Induction, The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 62, Issue 247, April 2012, Pages 365–385, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9213.2012.00044.x. An emerald is naturally green – we just need to look and see. some grass, the bushes in your mother’s yard, emeralds. Change ), Consider the following. But this way of thinking about induction cannot decide between all emeralds being grue or all emeralds being green, because an equally long positive correlation has been observed between emeralds and greenness as has been observed between emeralds and grueness. Each instance of finding a green emerald (and none of any other color), is supposed [^1]. We suppose that “green” can easily and legitimately figure in our inductive inferences. Here’s the thought. Every emerald, then, is green. Let’s return to our consideration of the grue and green emeralds. both that the next emerald to be observed will be green, and that it will be blue. So something is grue if it is first observed to be green before some arbitrary time, it must be blue (and not green) to be grue. Without a concept of causation, I cannot experience a causal relation between A and B and will not come to believe or hypothesize that all As are Bs. Presumably, the rules of induction are what enable us to project into the future – that is, to be able to make accurate predictions with regard to each subsequent, unobserved instance. defined in terms of what color something is if observed before now. Change ), You are commenting using your Twitter account. A lawlike inductive hypothesis is confirmed by its positive instances [^5]; a coincidental inductive hypothesis is not confirmed by its positive instances. Consider, for example, the following argument: This argument seems, by the standard suggested above, to be a perfectly good inductive The problem Now consider the set of grue things, and peacocks and blueberries first observed after. premises can provide a good inductive argument for a given conclusion. Moreover, while grue is admittedly an artificial term, that does not mean that it is illegitimate to predicate it of natural objects. But this way of thinking about induction cannot decide between all emeralds being grue or all emeralds being green, because an equally long positive correlation has been observed between emeralds and greenness as has been observed between emeralds and grueness. “Green” is a predicate that applies to every observed emerald. But what is it about “green”, rather than “grue”, that allows it to legitimately figure in our inductive inferences? . I give it an objective Bayesian formalisation, and contrast it with Goodman's and Sober's solutions, which make appeal to both methodological and non‐methodological considerations, and those of Jackson, Godfrey‐Smith, and White, on which explanatory considerations play a very different role. ( Log Out /  We can’t see anything about. When we say X is grue, we say that X belongs to the set of grue things. ...This looks flagrantly circular ...But this circle Goodman discusses a number of attempts to formulate canons off inductive inference in �3. But if “grue” is not a legitimate predicate, then the mystery disappears. A lawlike inductive hypothesis is confirmed by its positive instances [^5]; a coincidental inductive hypothesis is not confirmed by its positive instances. This is easy and legitimate. Now let’s define a new predicate, “grue”. Green predicates a naturally occurring property, where grue predicates an artificial and contrived property that does not reflect our natural ontology. But if “grue” is not a legitimate predicate, then the mystery disappears. that ‘grue’ is not in the former category, and that every predicate is in the latter But you do have a concept of causation, and this suggests that it comes from our perceptual experience. Plainly, by showing that it conforms to This is part of what makes ( Log Out /  But if we can in fact perceive causal relations, then this will be how we come to differentiate between the lawlike and coincidental and thus come to have beliefs about the unobserved. Don't already have an Oxford Academic account? says, “As principles of deductive inference, we have the familiar and highly Why the difference? two other predicates, ‘green’ and ‘blue.’ But, as Goodman points out, things are not so simple. confirmed by their instances. The traditional view of induction works like this. accepted deductive practice. Objects that are grue before. But when I look at a grue emerald, I do not believe that something caused it to be grue. So every observed emerald has (so it seems) supported the hypothesis that : all emeralds are green, and the hypothesis that all emeralds are grue. defective in this way. A third response to Goodman’s problem is to appeal not to the way in which ‘grue’ is defined, How did we acquire it [^6], ? is a virtuous one. As Goodman And that means they’ll be blue! A first thought is that ‘grue’ is illegitimate because it makes reference to a specific time; it is grass and emeralds first observed before t, and peacocks and blueberries first observed after t. Note that it is just as easy and legitimate to consider this set as it was to consider the green set.

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